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Tiivistelmä
Vauriovakavuussäännöt laivoille kehittyvät jatkuvasti. Muun muassa muuttuvat operoin-
tiprofiilit ja uudet tutkimustulokset pakottavat Kansainvälisen merenkulkujärjestön
IMO:n kehittämään uusia vauriovakavuussääntöjä.
Euroopan meriturvallisuusviranomainen EMSA totesi vuoden 2008 tutkimusprojektis-
saan SOLAS 2009 vauriovakavuussäännöt puutteellisiksi, jonka johdosta IMO aloitti ke-
hitysprosessin näiden sääntöjen parantamiseksi. Useita ehdotuksia sääntöjen kehittä-
miseksi esitettiin. Vuonna 2017 SOLAS 2020:nä tunnettu sääntömuutos vauriovakavuu-
teen hyväksyttiin, ja se astuu voimaan vuonna 2020. Päämuutos säännöissä on uusi las-
kutapa vaaditulle osastointi-indeksi R:lle.
Lisääntynyt merenkulku polaarisissa vesissä on aiheuttanut tarpeen näillä alueilla ope-
roiviin laivoihin keskittyvään säännöstöön. Onnettomuuksista selviämisen kannalta tär-
keitä ovat vauriovakavuussäännöt, jotka ottavat jäävauriot huomioon. Vuonna 2014 hy-
väksytty Polarkoodi astui voimaan vuonna 2017. Polarkoodi asettaa lisävaatimuksia po-
laarisissa vesissä operoiville aluksille, mukaan lukien vauriovakavuussäännöt uusille lai-
voille.
Tämä diplomityö tutkii Polarkoodin ja SOLAS 2020:n vauriovakavuussääntöjen yhteis-
vaikutuksia pienten risteilijäalusten suunnittelussa. Tarkoituksena on selittää näiden
sääntöjen taustaa sekä analysoida niiden vaikutuksia esimerkkilaivan avulla. Tavoitteena
on selvittää, mitä valintoja tulee tehdä suunniteltaessa pientä risteilijäalusta, joka nou-
dattaa molempia säännöstöjä.
Työn tuloksena selvisi, että paras ratkaisu uusien vauriovakavuussääntöjen kannalta on
cross-flooding -putkien hyödyntäminen. Tämän lisäksi vähäinen osastoinnin lisääminen
toimii paikallisten vakavuusongelmien ratkaisussa. Huomattiin myös, että SOLAS 2020
vauriovakavuussäännöt ovat rajoittavampia suunnittelun kannalta kuin Polarkoodin
säännöt.
Avainsanat Polarkoodi, SOLAS 2020, vauriovakavuus, jäävaurio, matkustajalaiva
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Abstract
Damage stability regulations for ships are constantly evolving. Changing operational pro-
files and results from new research, amongst others, force International Maritime Organ-
ization IMO to develop new regulations for damage stability.
After a research project conducted by European Maritime Safety Agency EMSA in 2008
found SOLAS 2009 damage stability rules lacking, IMO started a development process to
improve the damage stability regulations. Several proposals on how to improve the regu-
lations were presented. In 2017, a new set of damage stability regulations known as SO-
LAS 2020 was adopted and will enter into force in 2020. The main difference in the reg-
ulations is new formulas for calculating required subdivision index R.
The increased amount of marine traffic in polar waters has caused a need for regulations,
which focus on ships operating in these areas. Taking ice damages into account in these
regulations is important for survivability. Polar Code, adopted in 2014, entered into force
in 2017. It sets additional requirements for ships operating in polar waters, including
damage stability regulations for new-built ships.
This thesis studies the combined effect of the damage stability regulations of Polar Code
and SOLAS 2020 in the design of cruise ships. The aim of this thesis is to explain the
background of these regulations and analyse the effect of them with an example case. The
purpose is to find, what design choices are required to design a small cruise ship, which
can comply with both sets of regulations.
As a result, it was found that utilizing cross-flooding pipes is the best solution in regards
to the new damage stability regulations. In addition to that, slight addition of subdivision
works at the solving of local stability problems. It was also noticed that SOLAS 2020 dam-
age stability regulations are more restrictive for design than those of Polar Code.
Keywords Polar Code, SOLAS 2020, damage stability, ice damage, cruise ship
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7Acronyms
A Attained subdivision index
B [m] Breadth of the ship
BM [m] Metacentric radius
ds [m] Deepest subdivision draught
dp [m] Partial subdivision draught
dl [m] Lightest subdivision draught
GM [m] Metacentric height
GZ [m] Righting arm lever
i Index of compartment or group of compartments considered
IT [m4] Moment of inertia of the waterplane
K Constant used in calculation of si, depends on ship type and θe
KM [m] Height of the center of buoyancy
KG [m] Height of the center of gravity
L [m] Length of the ship
M Metacenter
Mst [kg*m2/s2] Righting moment
Mulk [kg*m2/s2] External moment
N Number of people on board
pi Probability, that i may be flooded
R Required subdivision index
Range [degrees] Range of positive righting lever
si Probability of survival after flooding i
T [m] Draught of the ship
VCG [m] Vertical center of gravity
W [ton] Weight of the ship
Δ [ton] Displacement
[kg*m/s2] Buoyancy vector
θe [degrees] Equilibrium heel angle in any stage of flooding
θv [degrees] The angle, where the righting level becomes negative
ϕ [degrees] Angle of inclination
ߘ [m3] Volume of displacement
8Abbreviations
BMVI Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (Ger-
many)
COLREG International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency
EU European Union
FCS Flooding Containment System
FSA Formal Safety Assessment
GOLADS Goal-based Damage Stability
ICLL International Convention on Load Lines
IMCO Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
IMO International Maritime Organization
IS 2008 Intact Stability Code, 2008
MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (marine pollution)
MDO Marine Diesel Oil
MES Marine evacuation system
MSC Maritime Safety Committee
R&D Research and development
RoPax Ro-Ro passenger vessel
SDC Sub-committee on ship design and construction
SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
SPI Survivability Performance Index
UIWL Upper ice waterline length
UN United Nations
91 Introduction
1.1 Cruise ships
A cruise ship is a type of passenger ship, which is used for pleasure voyages, where on-board
amenities and activities may be more important than transportation. Passenger ships concen-
trated on transportation are called ocean liners. Ocean liners are passenger ships, which are
dedicated to transporting passengers from one point to another rather than doing round trips
like cruise ships. However, the distinction between cruise ships and ocean liners has blurred
in terms of operation profile. Larger cruise ships may operate like ocean liners, taking longer
trips which may last even months. The differences can be found in terms of construction.
Ocean liners are built to withstand rougher sea conditions by having for example higher
freeboard and stronger plating.
In this thesis, the term “cruise ship” is used to describe both cruise ships and ocean liners.
The term “cruise ship” rather than “passenger ship” is used to exclude RoPax vessels, an-
other type of passenger ship. This exclusion is made, because the damage cases of RoPax
vessels differ from those of cruise ships. For example, the issue of water-on-deck is only
applicable to RoPax vessels. Also, the damage stability calculation according to SOLAS
2020 rules are slightly different for RoPax and cruise ships. Ferries and narrowboats are not
included to the definition of “cruise ship” in this thesis either. Ferries and narrowboats are
types of passenger ship, which tend to be used in inland waterways and may often not comply
with SOLAS regulations.
There is a lot of variation within the cruise ship -group. The smallest cruise ships have only
a few passengers, but those are quite uncommon and also do not need to comply with SOLAS
regulations. Nowadays, the largest cruise ships are hundreds of meters long with capacity
for thousands of passengers.
1.2 Background
The first damage stability regulations for ships were adopted in 1914 in response to the con-
cerns raised by the sinking of Titanic in 1912. These regulations were a part of a convention
aiming to improve the safety of sea faring. The convention was named the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). SOLAS has been developed and updated
over the years, first through new conventions, nowadays through amendments and is upheld
by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The currently effective damage stability
regulations are found in SOLAS 2009. In SOLAS 2009 chapter II-1 the safety level of pas-
senger ships regarding stability is determined by the R-index, which depends on the length
of the ship and the number of passengers on-board. The safety level is considered to be
sufficient if the A-index, which is calculated for the watertight subdivision, is greater than
the R-index.
Even before SOLAS 2009 damage stability regulations entered into force, concerns were
raised, whether the regulations set the safety level requirements high enough. Numerous
research projects were conducted and they found SOLAS 2009 lacking and the decision was
made to revise safety standard. Also, the 2012 accident of Costa Concordia contributed for
the concerns about whether the safety needs to be raised after flooding. The results of the
research projects together with the accident led to revision of SOLAS II-1.
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SOLAS regulates the safety of sea faring in open waters, which at its conception in 1914
was sufficient. However, nowadays there is need for regulations for ships travelling in polar
waters. Transporting cargo through Northeast Passage or taking scenic cruises in the Ant-
arctic waters are of this day. In the same way as Titanic and Costa Concordia have affected
SOLAS regulations, such accidents as e.g. MV Explorer contributed to deciding that regula-
tion in polar waters was needed. Regulations which take into consideration ice and other
polar water conditions, were adopted in 2014 by IMO.
The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) entered into force
in 2017. Also in 2017, new damage stability regulation amendments for SOLAS were agreed
upon and will enter into force in 2020 (SOLAS 2020). SOLAS 2020 damage stability regu-
lations introduce new R-index for passenger ships, which for ships with less than 400 people
on board is a constant 0.722. In Polar Code, the damage stability regulations concern the
survivability index and the extent of damage caused by ice. If a cruise ship operating in polar
waters is going to be designed, it needs to comply with both SOLAS and Polar Code.
1.3 Research problem, goal and scope
Polar Code is a relatively new regime, having entered into force in January 2017. SOLAS
2020 amended damage stability regulation was only adopted in June 2017 and will enter into
force in two years’ time. Both sets of regulations are quite new and therefore there has not
yet been documents or guidelines published concerning the effect of these regulations on
design. Also, there has not yet been ships built complying to both of these sets of rules,
which would have gone through the class approval process. The lack of precedent cases
makes it relevant to study the combined effects of the damage stability regulations of Polar
Code and SOLAS 2020 on design. Limiting the study to small cruise ships is of interest,
because for them, the R-index is constant, which is a significant change from previous reg-
ulations and the change in the R-index is bigger than for ships with more passengers. Also,
because subdivision for small ships is already challenging, examining the effect of the added
restrictions of Polar Code is worthwhile.
The literary part of this thesis gives an overview of the stability of ships as a physical phe-
nomenon with emphasis on damage stability and reviews the solutions for improving the
damage stability and survivability of a vessel in damaged state. Also, the development of
damage stability regulations in SOLAS and Polar Code is examined, including the research
projects conducted to find the new R-index for SOLAS 2020.
The experimental part of the study is carried out as a case study. The purpose of the case
study is to examine how the new damage stability regulations of SOLAS 2020 can be com-
bined with the damage stability regulations of Polar Code in the case of small cruise ships.
“Cruise ship” is defined in chapter 1.1 of this thesis. In this study, a “small” cruise ship
means a cruise ship with less than 400 people on board, but which still is considered passen-
ger ship under the SOLAS regulation (more than 36 people on board).
The study of a vessel’s damage stability is limited to the examination of SOLAS II-1 part
B1 with the amendments approved in MSC 98 and to subchapter 4.3.2 of Polar Code. Inter-
national Convention of Load Lines (ICCL 66/68) and Intact Stability Code 2008 (IS 2008),
which must be taken into account in the design of passenger ships, are not examined in this
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study. The concept ship of the case study is designed to fulfil the requirements of the afore-
mentioned conventions and codes.
Dynamic phenomena, such as the swaying of the vessel due to waves, are not studied sepa-
rately. These phenomena are taken into account within the criteria of the SOLAS regulations.
The forming of ice on ship’s external structure is also not considered. Icing is an issue related
to the intact stability and is excluded, as this thesis concentrates on the damage stability of a
ship.
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2 Damage stability
2.1 General
Stability is the vessel’s ability to resist inclination and to return to equilibrium state. In prin-
ciple, there are two conditions for a ship to be considered stable. Firstly, the forces and mo-
ments acting on the ship, made up of ship’s weight, buoyancy and external loading, must be
balanced. This means that the resultant force and moment have to be zero. Secondly, the ship
has to return to its original state and position after the external disturbance is removed. When
a ship is damaged, its stability usually decreases significantly. This must be taken into ac-
count in the design in the form of stability reserve, so that the ship survives even when dam-
aged.
In ship design, damage stability was not taken into account before 1850s and even then, only
for war ships. At first, only the ship’s ability to float after damage was considered. Broader
study of damage stability for passenger ships started in more rapid fashion after the sinking
of Titanic in 1912. Damage stability means the ship’s ability to keep its stability after it has
been damaged. When damage stability is studied, it is assumed that the ship has suffered
different sized damages at various points of the hull. The effect of the damages to the ship’s
equilibrium and stability is then calculated. This chapter presents factors affecting stability
in general and especially damage stability.
2.2 Small angles
The stability of a vessel at small angles is called initial stability. When dealing with small
angles, the vessel is assumed to have vertical sides and the waterplane area is assumed to
remain constant. To illustrate the ship heeling at a small angle, figure 1 shows a ship heeling
by the external moment Mulk.
Figure 1. Initial stability model [1]
13
The external moment causes the ship to heel by a small angle ϕ and causes the buoyancy
point B to shift from its original position B0 along the buoyancy curve to Bϕ. The buoyancy
vector Δ is perpendicular to the waterline and intersects the symmetry plane at the metacenter
M. The ship’s weight W and buoyancy are equal but opposite forces and therefore the right-
ing moment can be calculated:
ܯ௦௧ = −Δࡳࡹ૙sinϕ ≈ −Δࡳࡹ૙ϕ (1)
, where GM0 is the metacentric height.
When the sum of the righting moment Mst and the external moment Mulk is zero, the ship is
statically in balance. Therefore, for the ship to be stable the metacentric height must be pos-
itive, i.e. the metacenter must be located above the center of gravity G.
The metacentric height can be expressed:
ࡳࡹ૙ = ࡷ࡮૙ + ࡮૙ࡹ૙ − ࡷࡳ (2)
Where KB0 is the z-coordinate of the buoyancy center (K is the keel point located on the
centerline of the ship), KG the z-coordinate of the center of gravity and B0M0 is the meta-
centric radius, which is calculated:
࡮૙ࡹ૙ = ூ೅ఇ (3)
, where IT is the moment of inertia of the waterplane area along the x-axis and ߘ is the volume
of displacement.
2.3 Large angles
With heel angles exceeding 6 degrees, the initial stability model does not usually apply. The
B-curve is no longer a part of the arc of a circle and the metacenter does not stay at its original
position. Usually, large inclination causes the metacenter to move upwards and off the sym-
metry plane, as illustrated in figure 2.
The assumption made of the waterplane area of the ship remaining constant is no longer
applicable in the case of large inclination angles and the midpoint of the waterplane area (the
center of flotation) shifts accordingly.
When studying large inclination angles, the stability of a ship is usually described with the
length of the righting arm. The righting moment can then be calculated:
ܯ௦௧ = ܩܼ ∙ Δ (4)
, where GZ is the length of the righting arm. [1]
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Figure 2. Stability lever at large heel angles [1]
2.4 Effect of a moving mass
Containers hoisted by a ship’s own crane, poorly secured cargo, the free surfaces of trans-
ported liquid cargo etc. can cause part of the mass on board to shift and thus move the posi-
tion of the center of gravity. In the case of a damaged ship, the free surface of the water
flooding in the damaged compartments is also a moving mass. The center of gravity of the
flood water is free to follow the ship’s heeling motion and decrease the stability of the ship.
The rise of the center of gravity due to free surface effect at small inclinations is:
ܩܩଵ = ଵ୼∑ ݕ௜݅௫೔௡௜ (5)
, where the moments of inertia with respect to the longitudinal axis is
݅௫ = ௕య௟ଵଶ (6)
The breadth of the tank has a strong effect on the loss of buoyancy caused by the free surface
effect. [2]
2.5 Added weight or lost buoyancy
To assess the stability of a damaged ship, there are two methods. These methods are the
method of added weight and the method of lost buoyancy, which examine the damage con-
dition from different points of view. In the method of added weight, the buoyancy of a dam-
aged ship is the sum of the buoyancy of the ship before damage condition and the weight of
the flooded water. Therefore, the buoyancy and the position of the center of gravity change.
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In the method of lost buoyancy, the flooded compartments are excluded from the volume of
the ship. The weight of the ship and the position of the center of gravity do not change.
Which method is used depends on the category of flooded compartment in question (see
figure 3). The added weight method can be used when the flooded compartment is fully filled
with water and does not have a free surface (category 1) or when the water level in the
flooded compartment does not extend to sea level and therefore stays flat and parallel to the
sea water surface (category 2). The method of lost buoyancy is used when the water in the
flooded compartment extends to the sea water level (category 3).
Figure 3. From left to right: category 1, 2 and 3 of flooded compartments [1]
Both methods describe the damage condition realistically and give at the final stage the same
draught, angle of inclination and righting moment. However, due to the different approaches
of the methods, they give different displacement, center of gravity and metacentric height.
In the damage stability regulations of SOLAS, it is expected that the method of lost buoyancy
is used. [1]
2.6 Effect of weather conditions
Ship can lose stability in waves in many ways. A ship travelling at forward speed encoun-
tering regular or irregular stern quartering waves with low encountering frequencies can ex-
perience static loss of stability. In this type of loss of stability, the ship experiences tempo-
rarily critically reduced righting arm, which can lead to the ship capsizing.
Dynamic loss of stability can occur when extreme rolling motions and lack of righting en-
ergy affect the ship. In the case of dynamic rolling, the ship rolls to the windward side in the
wave through and to the leeward side on the wave crest, spending more time in the wave
crest due to surging. Therefore, the righting arm reduces and restores asymmetrically. The
roll motion can build up over a number of wave encounters to a critical level causing the
ship to capsize, usually to the leeward side.
Ship in longitudinal head or following waves may experience large amplitude roll motions
caused by the periodic changes in the static righting arm due to the time-varying roll restor-
ing characteristics. This is called parametric excitation and it is characterized by roll motions
occurring at around the natural roll period and twice the encounter period. Resonant excita-
tion can happen when a ship is excited at or close to its natural roll frequency. Severe roll
motion overwhelming the ship due to steep, breaking waves can cause impact excitation,
which is especially dangerous for small ships in steep seas.
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The wave-induced, undesired, large amplitude change in heading angle is called broaching.
It can happen in three ways; by a single wave; due to successive overtaking waves at low
speed; or due to low frequency, large amplitude yaw motions. [3]
In addition to waves, wind can also be problematic for the ship’s stability. Difficult weather
conditions may cause accidents to ships, which in turn can cause damage. Strong, gusty wind
or heavy sea can induce an inclining moment. To return to an upright position, the ship must
do work equal but opposite to the work created by the inclining moment. The damage sta-
bility regulations can acknowledge this by setting a minimum area that must be under the
positive side of the GZ-curve and by limiting the inclination angle up to which the area is
calculated.
2.7 Consequences of damage
The extent and location of the damage are key factors regarding the stability of the ship and
through that, the risk of losing the ship. SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea) has collected statistics on damages, which serves as a base for the damage sta-
bility regulations. In the statistics, the length of the damage varies between one and 30 me-
ters, with the smallest damages typically not causing flooding, because they do not extend
below the waterline. If there is flooding, it can have several consequences.
As the water floods in, there will be change in draught. The draught increases until the dis-
placement equals the displacement of the ship before the damage with the flooded water in
compartments subtracted. The ship will also trim until the center of gravity of the displace-
ment of the damaged ship settles to the same vertical latitudinal level as the center of gravity
of the damaged ship.
If the damage is located asymmetrically in comparison with the centerline of the ship, the
ship will heel to the damaged side until the center of gravity of the displacement of the dam-
aged ship is at the same vertical longitudinal level as the center of gravity of the damaged
ship. The ship can also heel even in a symmetrical damage case, if the damage has caused
the metacentric height GM to be negative. In that case, the ship heels until the GM is positive
again. In both trimming and heeling, large angles may immerse openings, which will cause
water to flood in through them and cause even bigger inclination.
Normally, the flooding caused by damage will affect GM negatively. The height of the center
of buoyancy KB will raise due to the increase of draught and the ship trimming. The decreas-
ing of waterplane decreases the radius of curvature BM. On the other hand, the increase of
draught causes BM to increase. The change in GM can be calculated:
ࡳࡹ = ࡷ࡮ + ࡮ࡹ− ࡷࡳ (7)
And the change in BM can be calculated:
࡮ࡹ = ூ೅భ
ఇ૚
− ூ೅బ
ఇ૙
= ௏ೈ
ఇ૙ା௏ೢ
( ଵ
஺ೢ
ூ೅
்
− ࡮ࡹ૙) (8)
, where Aw is the waterplane area and Vw is the volume of the flooded water
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When the relation of breadth/draught is large and the curves of the ship are V-shaped, the
moment of inertia of the waterplane IT increases, when additional water floods in. This
causes an increase in the value of BM, and thus also increases GM.
The increase of draught causes the freeboard to decrease. This can cause the positive area
under GZ-curve to decrease and make the ship more susceptible to external loads. If parts of
the ship have bulkheads extending above the bulkhead deck, they can have positive effect
on the righting moment. They will have an especially positive effect at the stern and bow.
The displacement reserve at midship has less impact.
If achieving the equilibrium state of the ship requires the trimming, heeling and increase of
draught to cause the flooding to extend outside the watertight part of the ship, the ship will
not achieve equilibrium. Instead, the ship will sink and possibly before that capsize. If GM
is not lost at flooding, it is possible to try limit flooding and pump out the flooded water and
thus save the ship. [1]
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3 Current regulation
3.1 IMO
Because of the international nature of the shipping industry, it has been known for a long
time that regulations for it should be coordinated on an international level. Hence, the United
Nations Maritime Conference convened in Geneva from 19 February to 6 March 1948 and
established the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) with an in-
ternational treaty. The treaty entered into force on 17 March 1958. IMCO had its first meet-
ing in 1959. The name of IMCO was changed to the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) in resolutions A.358(IX) of 14 November 1975 and A.371(X) of 9 November 1977.
[4]
IMO has 172 member states, 171 of which are UN member states, and three associate mem-
bers. Its headquarter is located in London, United Kingdom. IMO is a specialized agency of
United Nations, which sets standards globally for the safety, security and environmental per-
formance of international shipping. The main purpose of IMO is to regulate the shipping
industry in such a manner that ship operators cannot seek advantage over each other by dis-
regarding safety of human life, cargo and environment.
International shipping covers more than 80 per cent of global trade and needs regulations
and standards agreed, adopted and enforced internationally. This is provided by the regula-
tory framework of IMO. IMO regulated areas include ship design, construction, manning,
operation, equipment and disposal to cover all aspects of international shipping. IMO slogan
[5] sums up the principles and goals of the organization: “safe, secure and efficient shipping
on clean oceans”.
IMO comprises of an assembly, a council, five main committees and several sub-committees
supporting the work of the main committees. The assembly, open for participation for all the
member states, is the governing body of IMO and it meets every two years. The council,
comprised of 40 member states elected by the assembly, acts as the governing body between
the assembly sessions. The committees conduct the technical work of IMO. The five main
committees are the Maritime Safety Committee, the Marine Environment Protection Com-
mittee, the Legal Committee, the Facilitation Committee and the Technical Co-operation
Committee. IMO is supported by a permanent secretariat of people representing the member
states of the organization and headed by a periodically elected Secretary-General.
IMO has some 60 legal instruments as guidance to the regulatory development of its member
states to improve safety at sea, help trading between seafaring states and protect the marine
environment. Among the legal instruments of IMO are a number of conventions, codes and
regulations such as MARPOL Convention governing the pollution from ships, SOLAS for
the safety regulation and COLREG for the navigation rules, to mention but a few. Other
conventions, codes and regulation set rules and standards for training of the crew, oil pollu-
tion, ballast water treatment, communication between vessels etc. In this thesis, the damage
stability regulations of SOLAS are studied and used in the design and evaluation of the case
ship. [5]
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3.2 SOLAS
3.2.1 History
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) is one of the oldest
conventions regarding the safety of maritime traffic. It is an international maritime treaty,
which determines minimum safety standards in the construction, equipment and operation
of merchant ships. SOLAS is generally regarded as the most important international treaty
for the safety of merchant ships. SOLAS requires that its signatory flag states ensure that
ships under their flag comply at least with the standards set in SOLAS. Approximately
99.14% of the merchant ships of the world in terms of gross tonnage are flagged by the 163
contracting states of SOLAS. [6]
The first SOLAS conference convened in 1914. In the early 20th century, passenger ships
were much more common than they are nowadays, because there was no air traffic and great
number of people were emigrating mainly from Europe to the Americas. Hundreds of people
were perished annually in accidents on the sea. However, it was not until Titanic sank in
April 1912 causing the death of 1500 passengers and crew members, that United Kingdom
Government proposed holding a conference to develop international regulations for the
safety standards of ships. The conference was attended by 13 countries and was mainly con-
cerned with the safety of human life. The conference produced the first SOLAS convention,
which was adopted on 20 January 1914 to be entered into force in July 1915. However, the
start of World War I prevented the convention’s entry to force, although many nations
adopted many of its provisions independently.
The first SOLAS convention introduced new international requirements for the safety of
navigation, life-saving appliances, watertight and fire-resistant bulkheads, radiotelegraph
equipment and fire prevention and firefighting appliances on passenger ships. Also, the con-
ference agreed on establishing the North Atlantic ice patrol.
In 1929, the second SOLAS convention was held in London with representatives from 18
countries attending. The convention, which entered into force in 1933, included several new
regulations and revised the international regulations for preventing collisions.
The third SOLAS convention in 1948 was held for the regulations to catch up with the tech-
nical developments of the past years and was attended by 34 countries. While following the
same patterns as the previous conventions, the third SOLAS convention had more detailed
regulations and covered wider range of ships. Updates were made, for example, to watertight
subdivision of passenger ships, stability standards, structural fire protection and radio com-
munications. Also, new chapter dealing with carriage of dangerous cargo was included.
In 1948, the year of the third SOLAS convention, UN established IMO and there was finally
a permanent international body capable of adopting regulations and legislation concerning
all aspects of international shipping, including those covered in SOLAS. In 1960, IMO held
the fourth SOLAS convention, which had representatives of 55 countries attending, a signif-
icant increase from the previous convention twelve years earlier. The convention again ad-
dressed the many technical improvements of the field of shipping industry. In the convention
a procedure for adopting amendments was introduced, which stated that amendments could
enter into force twelve months after being accepted by two-thirds of contracting parties of
the parent convention. However, the growing number of member states of such international
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organizations as IMO meant that for the amendments to come into force would take so long,
that the they would be out of date before the date of their entry to force.
3.2.2 SOLAS 1974
To speed up the process of bringing amendments into force, IMO decided that there was a
need for a new SOLAS convention. It was determined that the new convention should in-
clude all the amendments made thus far and introduce a new procedure which would ensure
that future amendments would enter into force within a reasonably short period of time.
In 1974, the fifth SOLAS convention was held in London with 71 countries attending. It
introduced a new tacit amendment procedure. The new procedure ensured a faster pace of
bringing amendments into force by assuming that the contracting governments accept the
amendments unless they make their objection known within a specified time.
The tacit amendment procedure is included in Article VIII of the SOLAS convention. It
stipulates that amendments to all chapters excluding Chapter I will be considered accepted
within two years or a specified time period fixed at the time of adoption unless they are
rejected by sufficient number of contracting governments within set time period. Sufficient
number of contracting governments is either one third of them or any number of contracting
governments whose combined merchant fleets represent at least 50 per cent of world gross
tonnage.
SOLAS 1974 entered into force in 1980 and with amendments it is the convention currently
in force. It is unlikely that it will be replaced as the tacit amendment procedure enables IMO
to react to technical developments and recognize flaws in a rapid manner.
The 1974 SOLAS convention included the chapters I-VIII, which had been established in
the first SOLAS convention. Nowadays, the convention also has chapters IX-XIV, which
have been added as amendments. The convention on the International Regulations for Pre-
venting Collision at Sea was adopted in an IMO conference in 1972, so SOLAS 1974 was
the first conference where Collision Regulations were not revised as it was decided, that they
should no longer to be appended to the SOLAS convention.
3.2.3 SOLAS 1990
Several amendments were made to different parts of the 1974 SOLAS convention over the
years. For this thesis, the amendments made in May 1990 are of particular interest. These
amendments added a new part B-1 of Chapter II-1, which introduced a new way to determine
the damage stability and subdivision. The requirements only applied to cargo ships 100 me-
ters or more of length, not to passenger ships, but they are of interest for this thesis, because
the requirements were based on “probabilistic” concept of survival. The probabilistic con-
cept was developed by studying IMO’s collected data relating to collisions. A pattern of
accidents could be detected and the findings could be utilized in practical improvement of
ship design. The probabilistic method gives more realistic results than the deterministic
method used before, because the former is based on statistical evidence whereas the princi-
ples of the latter are theoretical in concept. [7]
For cargo ships, required subdivision index R was determined based on the statistics col-
lected from collisions and calculation for the attained A index based on probabilities was
also determined. It was stated that A must be greater or equal to R. For passenger ships,
deterministic method was still used. [8]
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3.2.4 SOLAS 2009
The probabilistic method was introduced as an alternative for calculating damage stability
of passenger ships already in 1973 [7]. However, it was not until SOLAS 2009 that the prob-
abilistic method was taken into use as a primary calculation method for passenger ships
while unifying the calculation methods for cargo and passenger ships. When moving from
the deterministic method to the probabilistic method, it was important to keep the safety
level at the same level.
In the probabilistic method, R-index and A-index are calculated and for the ship to be stable
and sufficiently safe, it must be ascertained that ܣ ≥ ܴ. The probabilistic method takes into
account all possible damage combinations of length, height and penetration depth and sur-
vivability is calculated based on statistical data from damages to other ships. Because the
probabilistic method considers all the damage cases, the calculation process takes longer
than with the deterministic method, where the amount of damage cases is limited. The prob-
abilistic method is the more extensive of the two methods and it allows novel designs to
achieve the same level of safety as conventional design, which is not possible with the de-
terministic method.
In SOLAS 2009 the attained subdivision index A is calculated as the weighted sum of the
partial indices As, Ap and Al calculated for the draughts ds (deepest subdivision draught), dp
(partial subdivision draught) and dl (lightest service draught):
ܣ = 0.4ܣ௦ + 0.4ܣ௣ + 0.2ܣ௟ (9)
ܣ = ∑݌௜ݏ௜ (10)
, where pi is the probability of all damage cases, i.e. the probability that compartment (or
group of compartments) i may be flooded excluding the effect of horizontal subdivision
, and si is the probability of surviving of those damage cases, i.e. the probability of survival
after the compartment (or group of compartments) i is flooded including the effect of hori-
zontal subdivision.
In the case of passenger ships, SOLAS 2009 determines the required subdivision index R to
be:
ܴ = 1 − ହ଴଴଴
௅ೞାଶ.ହேାଵହଶଶହ (11)
, where ܰ = ଵܰ + 2 ଶܰ (12)
N1 = number of persons for whom lifeboats are provided
N2 = number of persons the ship is permitted to carry in excess of N1
As this thesis is written, the damage stability regulations of SOLAS 2009 are in force [9].
The probabilistic method adopted for cruise ships in SOLAS 2009 is an important improve-
ment for approaching the damage stability of a ship. In situations described by deterministic
regulations the ship either passes or fails, there is no middle ground. When using a probabil-
istic approach, non-survival case can be acceptable for some cases, as long as the likelihood
for the particular case to happen is low enough. This does not jeopardize the safety of the
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ship, because achieving the required safety level is still mandatory. Therefore, the probabil-
istic method ensures the same safety level as the deterministic method while also removing
from consideration the cases, which are very unlikely to happen. Thus, more realistic repre-
sentation of the safety level of a ship in damaged situations is achieved. The results given by
the probabilistic method are more realistic also because they are based on statistical data of
real cases. [10]
However, while the adoption of the probabilistic approach is an improvement for the damage
stability calculation, the formulation for the s-factor used in the probabilistic method in SO-
LAS is not optimal for cruise ships. To achieve a harmonized solution, the general formula-
tion of the s-factor for cargo ships is used for passenger ships. This is irrational, because
cruise ships are considerably different from both cargo ships and RoPax vessels, on which
the calculation is based on. [11].
From a cruise ship designer’s point of view, the damage stability regulations of SOLAS 2009
have both benefits and downsides. On the one hand, the probabilistic method allows more
freedom regarding for example the placement of watertight bulkheads. This is due to the
elimination of the limiting pass/fail criteria of the deterministic method. This means that any
such subdivision is acceptable, which provides that if the survivability of the damage is not
100%, the probability of the damage to happen is very low. On the other hand, SOLAS 2009
underestimates the survivability of cruise ships. The formulation of the s-factor does not
properly rate possible solutions for improving the cruise ship survivability. This hinders the
design work, as the designers’ knowledge of improving the survivability does not match
with the results given by calculations based on SOLAS 2009 regulations. [10] & [12]
There are some simplifications in SOLAS. The simplifications limit the ability of SOLAS
to represent real-life situations. Firstly, the attained index A does not include grounding,
only collision. Damages caused by grounding are different to damages caused by collision,
because in grounding the location of damages is different, typically more in the bottom than
on the sides. Also, in grounding the effect of stranding is significant to the stability of the
ship. [13] & [14]
Secondly, while the moment caused by wind is accounted for, the forces and moments
caused by waves are ignored. The probability of sea state is not considered, even though in
reality the waves can have a huge effect on the ship by heeling it over the angle that it would
reach just because of the damage suffered. [9]
Lastly, the s-factor does not cover complex subdivision. As has been discussed earlier in this
thesis, the accuracy of the s-factor for cruise ships is questionable. However, for simple sub-
divisions it can be calculated logically. For more innovative and complex subdivisions, the
calculation does not apply. This is not necessarily a major issue, because simple solutions in
subdivision are preferable, as they are easier to put into practice in construction. [13]
3.3 Polar Code
3.3.1 General
The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, better known as Polar Code, is
a set of regulations concerning shipping in Polar regions. It was adopted by IMO in 2014
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and entered into force on 1 January 2017, based on voluntary guidelines from 2002 and 2010.
Polar Code protects the two polar regions Arctic and Antarctic (figures 4 and 5) from mari-
time risks. The regulations set out in the Polar Code relate principally to ice navigation and
ship design for polar areas. [15]
Polar Code defines three categories for ships, based on their ice classes, not on their ice
breaking capabilities. The categories are as presented in the Polar Code [16]:
- Category A ship means a ship designed for operation in polar waters in at least medium
first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions.
- Category B ship means a ship not included in category A, designed for operation in polar
waters in at least thin first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions.
- Category C ship means a ship designed to operate in open water or in ice conditions less
severe than those included in categories A and B.
Figure 4. Maximum extent of Arctic area (northern hemisphere) [16]
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Figure 5. Maximum extent of Antarctic area (southern hemisphere) [16]
By most parts, the Polar Code mandatory rules apply to both new ships and all existing ships,
including those already in operation and those which will be converted for polar waters.
However, there are 10 requirements that only apply to new-builds. Damage stability regula-
tion 4.3.2, which will be covered in chapter 3.3.2 of this thesis, is one of the requirements
only applicable to new-builds. [16]
Due to the increasing amount of marine traffic, Polar Code is a needed addition to the regu-
latory framework of the seas. The regulations of SOLAS are designed to apply for ships
operating in open waters. The Arctic and Antarctic waters are very different environments
from open sea because of their extreme weather and ice conditions. Therefore, the conditions
on which SOLAS regulations are based, do not realistically represent the polar conditions.
A major issue with Polar Code is how much it references SOLAS. As mentioned before, the
open water conditions considered in SOLAS do not apply to polar waters. Therefore, using
SOLAS definitions and limitations as a basis for Polar Code can cause problems. For exam-
ple, SOLAS as the main rule defines that it applies only to ships on international voyages.
Therefore, Polar Code also applies only to ships operating between different countries. This
definition would exclude ships operating exclusively off Antarctica. This should not be the
case, as ships operating off Antarctica face same perils as other ships operating in polar
waters, regardless of which port they originate from. Non-international voyages should also
be required to comply with Polar Code in order to get the full benefit of the regime. [9] &
[17]
SOLAS [9] also states that “ships constructed before 1 January 2017 shall meet the relevant
requirements of the Polar Code by the first intermediate or renewal survey, whichever occurs
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first, after 1 January 2018”. Although it is defined in Polar Code, which requirements are for
all ships and which just for new-builds, the term “relevant requirements” is quite vague.
Also, military vessels are exempt from the Polar Code regulations according to SOLAS. It
would be beneficial to consider specifically for polar operations whether new-builds, mili-
tary vessels and non-internationally operating ships have to comply with Polar Code, rather
than relying solely on the application of SOLAS rules. [17]
3.3.2 Damage stability regulations
Damage stability regulations in Polar Code consist of a supplement to the calculation of si
in SOLAS II-1 part B1 and deterministic calculation of the ice damage extent. Regulation
4.3.2 in Polar Code states that following ice damage si = 1 for all loading conditions used to
calculate attained subdivision index A. In SOLAS 2009 the calculation for si is as follows
[9]:
ݏ௙௜௡௔௟,௜ = ܭ ∙ [ீ௓೘ೌೣ଴.ଵଶ ∙ ோ௔௡௚௘ଵ଺ ]భర (13)
, where as defined [9]:
GZ max is not to be taken as more than 0.12 m;
Range is not to be taken as more than 16°;
K = 1  if θe ≤ θmin
K = 0  if θe ≥ θmax
ܭ = ට ఏ௠௔௫ିఏ௘
ఏ ௠௔௫ିఏ ௠௜௡
 otherwise,
where:
θ min is 7° for passenger ships and 25° for cargo ships; and
θ max is 15° for passenger ships and 30° for cargo ships.
In SOLAS 2020 the calculation of si is expressed slightly differently, but it is essentially the
same for cruise ships (for RoPax there is a difference in calculation between SOLAS 2009
and 2020) [18]:
ݏ௙௜௡௔௟,௜ = ܭ ∙ [ ீ௓೘ೌೣ்ீ௓೘ೌೣ ∙ ோ௔௡௚௘்ோ௔௡௚௘]భర (14)
, where the definition from SOLAS 2009 differs in following ways [18]:
GZmax is not to be taken as more than TGZmax;
Range is not to be taken as more than TRange;
TGZmax = 0.20 m, for ro-ro passenger ships each damage case that involves a ro-ro space,
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TGZmax = 0.12 m, otherwise;
TRange = 20º, for ro-ro passenger ships each damage case that involves a ro-ro space,
TRange = 16º, otherwise;
The longitudinal and vertical ice damage extents in the damage stability regulation of Polar
Code are dependent on the size of the ship with these damage extents defined as percentages
of the dimensions of the ship. The larger the ship is, the bigger the damage length and height
are. The transverse penetration extent is always 760 mm regardless of the size of the ship. In
Polar Code, the damage dimensions and locations are expressed [16]:
.1 the longitudinal extent is 4.5% of the upper ice waterline length if centred forward of the
maximum breadth on the upper ice waterline, and 1.5% of upper ice waterline length other-
wise, and shall be assumed at any longitudinal position along the ship's length;
.2 the transverse penetration extent is 760 mm, measured normal to the shell over the full
extent of the damage; and
.3 the vertical extent is the lesser of 20% of the upper ice waterline draught or the longitu-
dinal extent, and shall be assumed at any vertical position between the keel and 120% of the
upper ice waterline draught.
The damage stability regulations of Polar Code, which are discussed in its fourth chapter,
are applicable to ships of categories A and B [16]. Many of the passenger ships designed for
polar waters, usually for polar cruise -experiences, will probably be designed in category C
[19]. The damage stability regulation is not mandatory for these ships, but for the safety of
the polar marine traffic, it would be wise to consider Polar Code rules for category C ships
also, when possible.
3.3.3 Interpretation of damage stability regulations
The damage stability rules in Polar Code are expressed in a concise manner, but they leave
room for some interpretation. Firstly, it is not clear, whether the longitudinal extent at the
areas where the hull has curvature (namely stern and bow) is measured parallel to X-axis
(figure 6) or following the curvature of the outer surface of the shell (figure 7). The former
interpretation is backed by section 1 of rule 4.3.2.2, where waterline length is mentioned.
Because waterline length is measured from the XZ-projection, it could be assumed that same
measurement method applies to measuring the damage length. The latter interpretation is
supported by section 2 of the rule, where it is said that transverse penetration is measured to
the normal direction of the hull. Therefore, it could be assumed that the damage length
should take into account the possible curvature of the hull.
Third interpretation could be that the extent would be measured from the curve defined by
the 760 mm transverse penetration extent, parallel to X-axis (figure 8), which would give
the largest “damage-box”. However, there perhaps is not an argument compelling enough
for explaining why the longitudinal extent of the damage would not be measured from the
full breadth of the upper ice water line. Therefore, the interpretations shown in figures 6 and
7 are considered as the sensible options for interpretation.
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Coordinate system used here is right-handed with the positive direction of the Z-axis being
from the keel line to the direction of the main deck.
Figure 6. Damage length measured parallel to X-axis
Figure 7. Damage length measured from the outer surface of the shell, following the curva-
ture of the shell
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Figure 8. Damage length measured parallel to X-axis from the inner part of the damage-box
(760 mm inside the hull)
Currently, there is no definitive interpretation on how to measure the damage length. In this
thesis, the interpretation illustrated in figure 6 is chosen, because it gives larger volume to
the damage-box. This means, that the values achieved in damage stability calculation are
more conservative and therefore give higher level of safety. Correspondingly, the vertical
extent of the damage is measured parallel to Z-axis.
The second issue regarding the interpretation of the damage stability rules is that it is not
stated in which direction vertical extent is measured in the bottom area of the hull. Ihalainen
[19] and Huuskonen [20] have interpreted in their Master’s Theses that the vertical extent
should be measured in Y-direction, because in the bottom area of the hull the damage pene-
tration is measured in Z-direction. The same interpretation is used here since all ships also
have a double bottom, which has the height of at least 760 mm and therefore larger than the
transversal extent of the damage [9] & [18].
Polar Code also has an overarching issue regarding the interpretation. In the development of
Polar Code, goal-oriented standards were recommended instead of prescriptive and deter-
ministic regulations. The goal-based approach is apparent in the damage stability chapter,
since all the chapters in the safety part start with a description of overall goals and functional
requirements. However, the prescriptive regulations supporting the goals and functional re-
quirements are highly technical and precise. This leads to a mixture of vague and precise
provisions, which gives an inconsistent image on how the regulations should be interpreted.
The goal-based approach in developing Polar Code is not apparent, since most of the regu-
lations are inflexible and not discretionary. [17] & [21]
In addition of being occasionally vague, Polar Code is missing some important parts, such
as testing standards. The missing of these does not affect the damage stability directly but
has a negative effect on the credibility of the regulations and is a clear indicator, that Polar
Code is not yet ready, and will need further amendments to fulfil its potential as a regulator
for polar operations. [17]
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4 Improving damage stability
4.1 Background
Rule changes often take place after major accidents. Accidents bring attention to problems,
which gives momentum to find solutions to these problems. Accidents also give realistic
information on what needs to be changed and bring to light problems that were previously
unknown. Two accident cases are introduced here to show why regulations to improve dam-
age stability are needed. The first case concerns mainly Polar Code while the second case
involves issues related to SOLAS.
4.1.1 MV Explorer, 2007
On 23 November 2007, a Liberian-register cruise ship Explorer sank in the Antarctic waters
after colliding with a section of land ice near King George Island in the Southern Ocean.
Explorer was built in 1969 to 1A1 ICE-A class and remained in its old class notation all
through its service, even though higher standards for ships traveling in icy waters had already
been introduced. The ship had completed more than 250 journeys to the Antarctic waters, so
both the ice class and the capabilities of Explorer seemed to be suitable for polar operations.
Nevertheless, the ship was not capable to handle impact with the hard land ice amongst the
first-year ice. Also, a watertight door between compartments was open, allowing the flood-
ing to extend to two compartments. The rules of the time obligated the ship to be able to
survive only one-compartment damages.
Even if the design and the construction are done to the best current knowledge, the changes
in operational areas and purposes may mean that the ship may not be able to safely fulfil its
purpose. Polar Code was designed to regulate ships operating in polar waters, but it is im-
portant to remember that it will not be until some time passes that we will see whether Polar
Code works in reality. [22]
Figure 9. Sinking of Explorer [22]
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4.1.2 Costa Concordia, 2012
On 13 January 2012, an Italian cruise ship Costa Concordia capsized and sank near Tuscany
after an impact with an underwater rock. The ship had been operating since 2005 and was
built to comply with the SOLAS regulations in force at the time.
The initial collision was due to errors made by the captain and crew (deviating from the
course, too high speed in night conditions etc.). The immediate and irreversible flooding,
however, was due to poor level of damage stability. Costa Concordia, while built to the
standards of its time, was not able to withstand the flooding of two contiguous compart-
ments. When two compartments were flooded, the ship had already met its limit conditions
in terms of buoyancy, trim and heel. The flooding of three more compartments increased the
draught of the ship enough to submerge the bulkhead deck and spur on the sinking. [23]
Both of the accidents mentioned here (Costa Concordia and Explorer) brought to light some
lacking in regulation and were instrumental in speeding up rule changes. However, both
accidents were also partly due to human errors. In the case of Costa Concordia, the captain
chose to steer the ship into too shallow waters. The captain of the Explorer, who had not
previously served in that position, misread the ice conditions. No amount of regulation will
eliminate human error, but it can eliminate design and construction errors and therefore im-
prove the safety significantly. [22] & [23]
Figure 10. Sinking of Costa Concordia [23]
4.2 Proposed alternatives for the R-index
In the 84th meeting of the MSC in 2008 concerns were raised that SOLAS 2009 did not meet
the standards of SOLAS 1990. Several research projects were conducted to find if the dam-
age stability regulations were sufficient. The result was, that based on SOLAS 2009 it would
be possible to design a ship, which does not survive certain damage cases and may capsize
and sink even in calm water. Different research projects suggested different calculation
methods for the R-index to raise the safety level of the ships.
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European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) had a couple of different research projects. The
proposal for the R-index that EMSA 2 came up with was:
ܴ ≥ 0.875 ݓℎ݁݊ ܰ < 100
ܴ ≥ 1− 10.0845 ∙ ܰ ∗ 36.67 ∙ 10ି଺ ∙ ܰଶ ݓℎ݁݊ 100 ≤ ܰ ≤ 375
ܴ ≥ 1− 10.0845 ∙ ܰ ∙ ݁ିቀಿషమఱబళబర ቁ ݓℎ݁݊ 375 ≤ ܰ ≤ 704
ܴ ≥ 0.968 ݓℎ݁݊ ܰ > 704 (15)
In the EMSA 3 report the calculation for the R-index was the same for any number of people
on board:
ܴ = 1 − ܥ1 ∙ 62004 ∙ ܰ + 20000
ݓℎ݁ݎ݁ ܥ1 = 0.8 − ଴.ଶହ
ଵ଴଴଴଴
∙ (10000− ܰ) (16)
The Goal-based Damage Stability - research project (GOALDS) had two suggestions for the
calculation of the R-index. In the first one the R-index is calculated differently depending
on the number of people on board:
ܴ = 0.9 ݓℎ݁݊ ܰ < 1000
ܴ = 0.9 + 0.075000 ∙ (ܰ − 1000) ݓℎ݁݊ 1000 ≤ ܰ < 6000
ܴ = 0.97 ݓℎ݁݊ ܰ ≥ 6000 (17)
The second suggestion did not differentiate between different number of people on board:
ܴ = 1 − ଶଷ଴଴
ହ∙ேାଶ଴଴଴଴
(18)
The United States of America had the following proposal for the calculation of the R-index:
ܴ = 0.75 ݓℎ݁݊ ܰ ≤ 400
ܴ = 1 − 355.5ܰ + 1022 ݓℎ݁݊ 400 < ܰ ≤ 1200
ܴ = 1 − ଵସଵ଴
ேା଻଺ଵ଴
ݓℎ݁݊ ܰ > 1200 (19)
The proposal for the R-index from Japan was:
ܴ = 0.0719 ∙ ln(ܰ) + 0.291 (20)
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Other research projects were also conducted. For example, BMVI studied together with Ger-
man shipyards the effect of increasing the R-index for small passenger ships, special vessels
and big yachts, but they were not able to find a cost-effective solution. Between 2005-2009
the EU-funded R&D project SAFEDOR concluded through series of formal safety assess-
ments (FSA studies) that the risk to human-life could be reduced cost-effectively by raising
the R-index. [24]
In 2016 a working group formed at the third meeting of IMO sub-committee on ship design
and construction (SDC) was tasked with finding a functional solution for calculating the R-
index. The working group studied all the proposals presented in this chapter and formed a
compromise solution. Their proposal for the R-index settled halfway between the R-indices
of SOLAS 2009 and GOALDS and approached the higher of the two R-indices proposed by
EMSA. Their proposal for the R-index is shown in table 1. This proposal was approved at
the 96th meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). [25]
Table 1. SDC3 decision for R-index [18]
Persons on board R
ܰ ≤1000 ܴ = 0.0000088 ∙ ܰ1000< ܰ ≤6000 ܴ = 0.0369 ∙ ln(ܰ + 89.048)+ 0.579
ܰ > 6000 ܽ݊݀ ܥ1 = 0.8− ଴,ଶହ
ଵ଴଴଴଴
∙ (10000 −ܰ) ܴ = 1− ܥ1 ∙ 62004 ∙ ܰ + 20000
4.3 SOLAS 2020
At the 98th meeting of the MSC on 15 June 2017 a new proposal for the R-index by China,
Japan, the Philippines and the USA was introduced. The proposal was approved unani-
mously and the amendments for SOLAS II-1 within resolution MSC.421(98) will come into
effect for ships for which the building contract is placed on or after 1 January 2020. The new
amended version of SOLAS will be known as SOLAS 2020. The approved R-index is shown
in table 2.
Table 2. R-index in SOLAS 2020 [18]
Persons on board R
ܰ < 400 ܴ = 0.722400 ≤ ܰ ≤ 1350 ܴ = ܰ7580 + 0.669231350 < ܰ ≤ 6000 ܴ = 0.0369 ∙ ln(ܰ + 89.048)+ 0.579
ܰ > 6000 ܴ = 1 − 852.5 + 0.03875 ∙ ܰܰ + 5000
In ships, where there are between 1350 and 6000 persons on board, the calculation method
for the R-index approved at MSC 98 is the same as that suggested at SDC3 and approved at
MSC 96. The calculation for the cases where the number of people on board is more than
6000 is similar to the SDC3 proposal, but with a simplified form where C1-variable is not
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calculated separately. In the cases, where there are less than 400 persons on board, the R-
index is a constant and then up to 1350 persons on board the R-index rises as a linear function
of N to meet the R-index of SDC3 proposal. The attained index A is calculated at the same
way as in SOLAS 2009 (see chapter 3.2.4). The main differences to SOLAS 2009 are:
- R-index is not dependable on length
- Number of people on board is no longer divided to those who are provided with a
lifeboat and to those that the ship is allowed to carry in excess, but is taken as one
number
- R is constant for passenger ships with less than 400 people [18]
Despite all the research that went into finding a new R-index, the R-index approved by MSC
98 is partly political rather than technical. There is little to no technical justification to why
R is constant for ships with N < 400. The biggest changes in the R-index from SOLAS 2009
to SOLAS 2020 happen for ships with N < 400 and ships with 700 < N < 2000. [26]
SOLAS 2020 damage stability regulations improve upon the safety level set in SOLAS 2009
but do not address the simplifications or the issue regarding the s-factor, which were dis-
cussed in chapter 3.2.4 of this thesis. The general formulation of the s-factor still remains
the same for RoPax and cruise ships, even though in real case experiences, the safety level
has been observed to be higher than SOLAS suggests. For example, Costa Concordia stayed
afloat for several hours, even though it was built to fulfil SOLAS 1990 standards. [23] &
[13]
Numerical simulations have also shown that the survivability of cruise ships has been un-
derestimated in SOLAS. It was found that when using a new Survivability Performance In-
dex (SPI), which represents ship’s behavior during flooding better, the differences in the s-
factor to SOLAS were around 2% for RoPax and over 7% for cruise ships. [27]
The reason why the calculation of the s-factor favors RoPax vessels is that in the last 20
years, the research concerning damage stability has focused on RoPax. GOALDS [28] and
EMSA [29] projects attempted to reformulate the s-factor for passenger ship, but ultimately
no significant change took place. In SOLAS 2020, the only difference between RoPax and
cruise in the calculation of the s-factor is, that the range of positive righting levers (GZ) and
the maximum GZ have different values. The formula is the same for both types of passenger
ship. The issue stems from the research project HARDER, upon which results IMO based
the s-factor formulation in SOLAS 2009. HARDER had a small and homogenous sample of
ships, which led to a formulation that underestimates the survivability of cruise ships. [18]
& [30]
The current damage stability regulations are largely based on model tests with RoPax. This
is due to the fact that model tests for cruise ships are complicated and expensive. However,
there is a big difference between RoPax and cruise ships. They have different risks and ac-
cident frequencies. Also, due to different internal subdivisions they have different sinking
behavior; cruise ships capsize rapidly whereas RoPax typically sink slowly. Therefore, re-
sults achieved for RoPax cannot be directly applied to cruise ships. Yet the same s-factor
formulation and same level of R-index is defined for both types of ship. [30]
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4.4 Combining SOLAS and Polar Code regulations
An easy solution for raising the A-index to meet the required subdivision index R of SOLAS
2020 would be increasing subdivision. The number of compartments would increase while
the size of the compartments would decrease. However, because the increase of R-index
from SOLAS 2009 to SOLAS 2020 can be several per cents for small ships, the required
frequency of bulkheads may lead to impractical designs.
The decrease in the size of the compartments brings about a problem with Polar Code. Ac-
cording to Polar Code, the longitudinal extent of damage caused by ice is 4.5% of the upper
ice waterline length if the center of the damage is forward of the maximum breadth of the
upper ice waterline (and 1.5% in other cases). If the subdivision is very dense, meaning that
there are many compartments in a short space, the ice damage will affect several compart-
ments at once. The same problem arises when considering the transverse extent of the dam-
age. The transverse extent of the penetration caused by ice damage is 760 mm. So, if the
transverse length of the compartments near the sides of the ship is less than 760 mm, the
damage will reach multiple compartments.
If a single damage involves multiple compartments, stability is considerably worse than
when only one compartment is damaged. If only one watertight compartment is damaged,
the damage will be limited within the watertight bulkheads. Separate damages in different
parts of the ship are naturally problematic, but usually containable. If the distance between
two adjacent transverse watertight bulkheads is smaller than the assumed damage length (i.e.
damage extends to more than one compartment), only one of the bulkheads is considered
effective according to SOLAS.
Because the longitudinal extent of damage is calculated as percentage of the upper ice wa-
terline length, it is dependent on the dimensions of the ship. The relative effect of ice damage
is therefore same for ships of all sizes, i.e. for bigger ships the longitudinal damage is as-
sumed to be bigger than for smaller ships.
The transverse extent of penetration will affect especially smaller vessels. The transverse
extent is the same for ships of all sizes, which means that for smaller ships the transverse
extent of the penetration is a bigger percentage of the breadth of the ship than for larger
ships. However, with the transversal extent being just 760 mm, it is highly improbable that
extent of the damage would be bigger than breadth of a compartment.
SOLAS 2020 uses probabilistic method for calculating damage stability, whereas Polar Code
has deterministic approach to damage stability calculation. While this might not cause prob-
lems in calculation, it creates certain inequality between ships of different sizes and types.
SOLAS 2020 regulations are based on statistical data, which means that while for example
R-index is different for different types and sizes of ships, it can be assumed to be equally
restrictive for all, because it is based in knowledge of real cases. The deterministic approach
is not based on real cases but instead on a pre-determined damage scenario. When the deter-
ministic calculations Polar Code are combined with the results of probabilistic SOLAS cal-
culations, difference between levels of restrictiveness is present for different ships. [16] &
[18]
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4.5 Solutions to improve damage stability
4.5.1 Changing main dimensions
When studying the effect of the main dimensions of the ship to the stability of the ship,
equation (2) from chapter 2.2 can be expressed:
ࡳࡹ૙ = ࡷ࡮૙ + ࡮૙ࡹ૙ − ࡷࡳ = ࡷ࡮૙ + ூ೅ఇ −ࡷࡳ (21)
Length
If only the length is increased without changing breadth or draught, KG may increase, which
decreases stability. If the length is increased at the at the expense of the draught, the stability
improves, except at large inclination angles.
Draught
By decreasing the draught of a ship in relation to the volume, it is possible to increase the
initial stability. At the same time, the limiting angle φD increases, causing the ship to lose
stability quickly at large angles.
Breadth
Out of the main dimension, the breadth has the most impact on the stability of the ship.
Increasing the breadth will also increase the moment of inertia of the waterplane IT.
ܫ் = ଶଷ∫ ݕଷ݀ݔ௅଴ (22)
That in turn leads to the increase of GM. The effect of breadth on stability is illustrated in
figure 11. A narrower ship has a smaller radius of curvature BM. The extent of the stability
of the ship is limited by limiting angle ϕD, which corresponds with limiting point BD. As we
can see from figure 11, the narrower ship (kapea laiva) has a larger limiting angle than the
wider ship (leveä laiva). When the ship inclines, its weight and buoyancy cause a righting
moment, the tension indicator of which is:
ℎ = ࡷࡹݏ݅݊ ϕ −ࡷࡳݏ݅݊ ϕ = ࡮૙ࡹݏ݅݊ ϕ−࡮૙ࡳݏ݅݊ ϕ = ࡳࡹݏ݅݊ ϕ (23)
and thus, if the GM is same for both of the ships, the narrower ship has shorter tension
indicator.
In addition to improving the stability, bigger breadth will also increase the area of the ship
that can be utilized in transporting more cargo or passengers.
A downside of increasing the breadth is that the ship has more resistance to motion, which
means that the ship is slower. Also, bigger resistance to motion means that the ship consumes
more fuel and is therefore more expensive to operate. Other downside is that the ship might
be too stable and have a strong reaction to waves. This decreases the comfort of people on
board, which is a crucial factor for passenger ships.
36
Figure 11. Effect of breadth on stability [1]
Freeboard
Freeboard is the distance between the waterline and the main watertight deck (weather deck
or freeboard deck). Raising the freeboard will mean that the weather deck immerses at bigger
angles. Therefore, the openings will also go underwater at bigger angles.
The effect of freeboard to stability is shown in figure 12, where two ships with equal dis-
placements, breadths and centers of gravity, but with different freeboards (f2 > f1) are com-
pared. The initial stability for the two ships is the same, but as we can see from figure 12,
the ship with the higher freeboard will put the weather deck underwater at bigger angles and
therefore be more stable of the two ships compared for the main part of the stability range.
The downside of raising the freeboard deck is that it will cause the vertical center of gravity
(VCG) of the ship to also raise, which will have a negative effect on the stability of the ship.
The effects to ship’s stability caused by increasing the freeboard must be considered sepa-
rately for each ship.
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Figure 12. Effect of freeboard on stability [1]
Volume of displacement
Increasing the volume of displacement of the ship without altering the length, breadth and
draught of the ship will cause the fullness of the hull to increase. This means that the VCG
of the displacement lowers and stability increases.
Vertical center of gravity
Lowering the vertical center of gravity of the ship is the best way to improve the stability of
the ship. With a lower VCG the metacentric height is bigger, which means that the ship is
less likely to incline to the side of the damage.
The downside of lowering the VCG is that in practice, either the deckhouse must be smaller
or the capacity for cargo must be decreased. In the case of passenger ships, this means that
there will be less space for passengers. This means less income for the ship and therefore it
is not cost-effective.
Shape of hull
The optimal shape of hull considering stability would be narrow stern and wide bow, because
narrow bow immerses easily while wide stern raises easily from the water and thus decreases
the stability. However, this type of hull design would not be optimal for e.g. resistance of
motion. [1]
4.5.2 Optimizing subdivision and compartment connections
Bulkheads
The largest possible length of flooded compartment, floodable length, can be calculated with
either added weight method or lost buoyancy method (see chapter 2.5). Vertically the flood-
ing is assumed to reach the margin line. Margin line is a line, which the waterline of the
damaged ship must not exceed and is located at least 76 mm below the edge of the bulkhead
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deck. Once the flooded length is calculated, it is multiplied with the subdivision index to
find the permitted length of the watertight compartments.
By adding transverse bulkheads or changing the location and orientation of longitudinal
bulkheads (B/5 bulkheads) it is possible to increase the A-index.
Usually in the design of the watertight subdivision of the ship, compromises have to be made.
The best possible A-index might not be achievable, because the location, size and usability
of storage, accommodation, equipment and structures might not allow that.
U-tanks
Tanks that go across the ship in the transversal direction reaching each side are called U-
tanks. The purpose of U-tanks is that they distribute the flooded water across the ship and
thus the water does not stay in on just one side of the ship. Therefore, U-tanks decrease
asymmetrical distribution of weight and consequently strong heeling, thus improving the
damage stability. The downside of U-tanks is that they tend to have a big volume, which
means that a damage to a U-tank allows a lot of water flood in, which can impair the damage
stability.
Cross-flooding
Cross-flooding means allowing the flooded water to flow into the undamaged compartment
opposite the damaged compartment on the other side of the centerline. This is executed by
using pipes connecting the compartments. The purpose of cross-flooding is to prevent the
ship from heeling strongly to the damaged side due to asymmetrical distribution of the
weight of the flooded water within the ship.
If cross-flooding pipes are used in a ship, intermediate stages of flooding must be taken into
consideration. Calculation for intermediate stages must be performed whenever the complete
fluid equalization is not instantaneous. Instantaneous equalization in regulation 7.2 of SO-
LAS Chapter II-1 is defined as equalization which is completed in less than 60 seconds. In
addition to compartments connected with cross-flooding pipes, bulkheads surrounding re-
frigerated spaces and longitudinal bulkheads with non-watertight doors are examples of
flooding situations, where equalization may take longer than 60 seconds.
When performing damage stability calculations for a ship fitted with cross-flooding devices,
it is important to study the intermediate stages, not just the final stage. In the final stage, after
a cross-flooding pipe has distributed flooded water from the damaged compartment to an
undamaged compartment for a fluid equality, the stability may be sufficient, but that does
not mean that the stability is sufficient before the equalization is completed. In the interme-
diate stages, the ship might have a larger heel angle than in the final stage. A large heel angle
is a decreasing factor for the stability in itself and it also may cause some openings to sub-
merge and thus decrease the stability even further. [9]
4.5.3 Other solutions
Bilge keels
Bilge keels, long and thin keels located longitudinally along the ship at bilge area, dampen
the rolling motion of the ship in the waves. Bilge keels lessen the motion of the ship in
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regards to the waves and therefore the waves bring less water on the deck of the ship. The
water-on-deck situation is governed by Stockholm Agreement and is particularly of interest
for RoPax vessels, which have large undivided areas such as car decks.
For cruise ships, water-on-deck is not usually a crucial problem. Also, bilge keels are not
taken into account in the damage stability regulations, so they give no benefit to the calcu-
lation of the A-index. [1]
Flooding Containment System
Traditionally, damage stability risk control options have been passive in nature, meaning
design measures, such as changing the main dimensions, installing bilge keels etc. The trou-
ble with passive protection is that it consumes deck and hull space and thus is not usually
cost-effective. In 2006, the Maritime Safety Committee approved at its 82nd session guide-
lines on alternative designs and arrangements for chapters II-1, which deals with damage
stability, and III of SOLAS. They entered into force on January 2009. The guidelines provide
a legislative instrument for improving safety through active means. [31]
One of these active methods is Flooding Containment System (FCS). The functioning
method of FCS is that highly expandable liquid foam is pumped into the flooded compart-
ment after damage has happened. The foam will close openings which do not have watertight
doors, reduce up-flooding, restrict the water from spreading to other compartments, form top
seals and minimize free surface effects. The research done by a spinoff company of the Uni-
versity of Strathclyde, Maritime Safety Innovations Ltd, found that FCS improved ships’
damage survivability greatly. Figure 13 shows the impact on survivability of FCS for cruise
ships. [32]
Figure 13. FCS impact on survivability for cruise ships [32]
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5 Case study
5.1 Introduction of the case ship
The case ship used in this study is a small cruise ship intended for short, two-week trips in
the Arctic or the Antarctic areas. As a reference for the initial design of the case ship, an
already constructed ship of similar size and purpose was used. However, the reference ship
was built to comply with SOLAS 2009. SOLAS 2020 and Polar Code were not considered
in the design of the reference ship and therefore are not considered in the initial design of
the case ship either. The aim of this study is to optimize the design to be compliant with
SOLAS 2020 and Polar Code.
The case ship fulfils the requirements of International Convention of Load Lines, Intact Sta-
bility Code and MARPOL. It is designed according to good engineering customs. The gen-
eral arrangement of the initial design is presented in figure 14 and appendix 1. The main
particulars are shown in table 3.
Figure 14. Profile of the case ship
Table 3. Main particulars of the case ship
Length overall 99.9 m
Length of design water line 94.0 m
Breadth 25.3 m
Draught 7.6 m
Displacement 10185 tons
Speed 16 knots
Gross tonnage 8626 tons
Number of people on board 273 persons
Ice class PC2
The case ship has capacity for 172 passengers and 101 crew members for a total of 273
persons on board. The accommodation for crew consists of two-person cabins for most of
the crew and single cabins for the higher-ranking members of the crew. All the passenger
cabins are two-person cabins. For the passengers, there are restaurants, cafes, clubs, spas, a
gym and a casino.
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The case ship is meant for 14-day operation at an operation speed of 16 knots to offer scenic
cruises at polar waters. There are four main engines, which use Marine Diesel Oil (MDO)
as fuel. The ship has enough fuel capacity for 30-day operation at the economical speed of
12 knots with a 10% reserve. There is also enough provision for 30 days. The ship’s capacity
for fresh water corresponds with 4.5 days of normal usage, and the ship is equipped with
machinery to convert sea water into fresh water.
To calculate the wind moment, a wind profile (figure 15) was created. Its center of gravity
and the area limited by it give an adequate approximation of the shape of the hull and the
deck structures. Projections, such as the axels of the propellers were not modelled and do
not show up in the wind profile either.
Figure 15. Wind profile
For the damage stability calculations, three initial conditions were defined as required in
SOLAS 2009 and 2020. These initial conditions are initial conditions in deepest subdivision
draught (DS), in light service draught (DL) and in partial subdivision draught (DP).
Deepest subdivision draught is the waterline, which corresponds to the summer scantling
draught of the ship. Light service draught is the service draught of the ship with all passen-
gers, crew and their effects, 10% of the consumables and enough ballast for stability and
trim. Partial subdivision draught is the draught that is obtained by adding 60% of the differ-
ence between DS and DL to the light service draught. The initial conditions are presented in
table 4. For all the initial conditions, the trim is zero.
Table 4. Initial conditions
T[m] GM[m]
DS 7.90 1.45
DP 7.26 1.25
DL 6.30 1.30
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5.2 Research method
The main tool used in this study is NAPA (Naval Architecture Package). NAPA is a soft-
ware, which allows ship designers to define for example the geometry, hydrodynamic prop-
erties, hydrostatic properties and stability of a ship. In this thesis, special interest is on dam-
age stability module, with geometry and loading condition modules also used. The damage
stability calculation was executed using NAPA Manager -tool. In this thesis, the shape of
the hull and the arrangement of the spaces with the watertight boundaries were defined using
NAPA software. The NAPA model for the initial design is presented in appendix 2. Because
the watertight bulkheads do not reach above the main deck (deck 4) the arrangement of the
spaces in decks from 4 up do not affect stability. The case ship has been modelled in NAPA
with detail up to deck 4. Above that, correct sized space reservations with their general pur-
pose were modelled, but with less detail (e.g. cabins are not individually modelled). The
arrangements in decks below deck 4 are presented in connection with each case.
Openings were defined in NAPA Manager and used in damage stability calculation. At the
final stage of any given damage the ship is not assumed to heel more than 7 degrees. There-
fore defining the opening seems irrelevant as they are not in any danger of submerging.
However, at the intermediate stages of some damage cases the ship may heel to over 7-
degree angle and thus the openings may affect the s-factor through disrupting the GZ-curve.
Openings are presented in appendix 3.
Damages were created and their A-indices were calculated in NAPA Manager. NAPA Man-
ager uses SOLAS 2009 rules in the calculation of A-index, but because it is the same for
cruise ships in SOLAS 2020, the results can be used here. Damages were created up to 7-
zone damages, because in the case of the ship in this study, 7-zone damages affect the third
decimal of the A-index and the required index R is defined with three decimals (0.722). After
the A-index was calculated, individual cases contributing the index could be observed in the
Analysis-part of NAPA Manager. Therefore, compartments and groups of compartments
with the weakest A-index could be found and focused on in the improvement of the design.
Damages caused by the ice were created by a macro within NAPA, which created ball-
shaped damages with a radius of 760 mm. Thus, the transversal extent of the damage was
correct for all the damages and the extent was always measured normal to the shell, even at
the curved parts of the ship (i.e. bow and stern). Horizontally, the damages were created at
the middle and at the end of each compartment both on the sides and on the bottom. Verti-
cally, the damages were created at the waterline and at the vertical ends of the compartments
below the waterline. These principles of creating damages was used in order to take into
account both single- and multiple-compartment damages. After the damages were created
by the macro, they were manually checked for the two instances where the macro would
give incorrect results. These instances are: 1) If, forward from the maximum breadth of the
UIWL, the length of a compartment was less than 4.5% of UIWL (4.23 m), a three-compart-
ment damage needed to be added and 2) If the length of a compartment at other areas was
less than the diameter of the damage-ball (1.52 m) but more than 1.5% of UIWL (1.41 m). a
three-compartment damage needed to be removed. These corrections were made by hand.
The ice damages were created separately for each case. The ice damages for the initial de-
sign, as created by the macro, are pictured in figure 16.
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Figure 16. Damages caused by ice according to Polar Code
In this study, three methods of improving damage stability were used: changing the arrange-
ment of U-tanks, modifying the subdivision and using cross-flooding devices. Other meth-
ods are introduced in chapter 4.5, many of which are not practical either because they require
major changes in the design (i.e. changing the main dimensions) or are not recognized by
the rules as a method to improve stability (i.e. bilge keels).
5.3 Case 1: Initial design
As mentioned in chapter 5.1, the initial design of the case ship is made to comply to SOLAS
2009, not SOLAS 2020 or Polar Code. However, in the initial design, optimal design for the
damage stability was already considered by maximizing symmetry. This was done by using
U-tanks and balancing the sizes and locations of smaller tanks. When possible, the tanks
opposite each other are identical in purpose as well as size, otherwise voids were used. Also,
the continuity of structures was taken into account when considering the placement of the
bulkheads. The compartment limits below the freeboard deck are shown in figure 17.
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Figure 17. Compartment limits below deck 4
For the initial design, the attained index A is 0.69265. The required index R according to
SOLAS 2020 is 0.722. All the damages caused by the except for one (figure 18) satisfied the
Polar Code -requirement of s = 1.
Figure 18. Ice damage with s < 1
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5.4 Case 2: U-tanks
Adding U-tanks can improve the damage stability of a ship by distributing the flooded water
symmetrically across the centerline. To see the effect of U-tanks, a design which is identical
to the initial design above double bottom (figure 17) but has more U-tanks in the double
bottom, was created. The U-tanks were also placed so that at least every second tank in the
longitudinal direction was a U-tank. The compartment limits in the double bottom are shown
in figure 19.
Figure 19. Compartment limits in the double bottom
The attained index A is 0.69433, which offers only marginal improvement to the initial de-
sign, where A = 0.69265. As in the initial design, all damages caused by ice but one had s =
1.
5.5 Case 3: Denser transversal subdivision
Because the A-index achieved with the initial design was not sufficient to satisfy SOLAS
2020 damage stability regulations, a new design with denser subdivision below deck 4 was
created. The general arrangement went through two incarnations named versions A and B of
case 3 (appendix 4), before a design with a sufficient A-index was found (figure 20). Water-
tight transversal bulkheads were added astern of the ship and compartment limits were ad-
justed for the new subdivision.
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Figure 20. Compartment limits below deck 4
In general, transversal bulkheads were added at areas where the potential A-index and the
achieved A-index differed the most. However, there are three exceptions. Firstly, the roll
reduction tanks were not divided with these bulkheads, because their structural requirements,
e.g. connection to air channels, did not allow that. Secondly, at the bow area, addition of
subdivision was moderate, so that the length of the compartment would not be less than the
longitudinal ice damage according to Polar Code. Thirdly, one of the areas, where the A-
index in the initial design most differed from its potential was between frames #62 and #89,
due to the big undivided area at that stretch (figures 17 and 20). However, the area could not
be divided with transversal bulkheads, as it contains the pump room and the engine room,
where space for the machinery is required.
The attained index A for the new design is 0.72598, which is above the R-index stated in
SOLAS 2020. The design also complies with the damage stability rules of Polar Code, as
for all ice damages s = 1.
5.6 Case 4: Cross-flooding
As seen from figure 20, trying to achieve an A-index sufficient for SOLAS 2020 require-
ments with just modifications to the subdivision leads to a very fragmented tank plan, which
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is not practical. Therefore, other methods to improve damage stability were needed. Adding
cross-flooding devices was chosen as a solution, because it is a method that has been widely
used and found effective and does not require major structural changes of the ship. At first,
the effect of cross-flooding devices was observed by calculating stability for a design, which
was otherwise identical to the initial design (figure 17), but with cross-flooding pipes added
between tanks in the double-bottom. In figure 21, red dots are the ends of cross-flooding
pipes. Each pipe connects tanks opposite each other across the centerline of the ship. The
cross-flooding pipes all have a diameter of 0.7 m. With these pipes, a complete fluid equal-
ization can be achieved in less than 10 minutes. Therefore, according to regulation 7.2 of
SOLAS chapter II-1, the survivability factor for passenger ships can be assumed as the small-
est values of sintermediate or sfinal. The equalization takes longer than 60 seconds, so it cannot
be assumed instantaneous and intermediate stages are calculated.
Figure 21. Cross-flooding pipes
With these added pipes, the attained index A was 0.7142, which is a clear improvement to
the initial design, where A = 0.69265, but not adequate for SOLAS 2020. Also, the require-
ments of Polar Code are not met, as one of the ice damages (same as with initial design, see
figure 18) has s < 1.
5.7 Case 5: Final design
As the A-index achieved with just a few cross-flooding pipes was very close to the required
index R, only minor changes to the subdivision were needed to the additional improvement
of the damage stability. The changes are shown in figures 22 and 23.
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Figure 22. Compartment limits below deck 4
Figure 23. Cross-flooding pipes
A transversal bulkhead was added at frame #27, a longitudinal bulkhead was added between
frames #33 and #37 at deck 3 and the continuity of structures was better followed by dividing
the ballast tanks at frames #33 - #42 to three instead of two tanks and placing a cross-flooding
pipe between them.
With these changes both the damage stability regulations of SOLAS 2020 and those of Polar
Code were satisfied as A = 0.72508 and for all ice damages s = 1.
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6 Analysis of the results
6.1 Case-specific analysis
6.1.1 Case 1: Initial design
SOLAS 2020: not fulfilled (A = 0.69265)
Polar Code: not fulfilled (one damage, where s < 1)
The A-index of the initial design falls nearly 0.03 short of the R-index defined in SOLAS
2020. This is not surprising, as the initial design is based on similar ships designed previously
to satisfy the requirements of SOLAS 20009, where the required index R is smaller.
While Polar Code was not considered in the initial design, only one of the damages caused
by the ice did not fulfil its damage stability regulations. This would indicate that the imple-
mentation of Polar Code will not cause difficulty in the design.
6.1.2 Case 2: U-tanks
SOLAS 2020: not fulfilled (A = 0.69433)
Polar Code: not fulfilled (one damage, where s < 1)
The addition and new placement of U-tanks does not significantly improve the damage sta-
bility. The difference between the A-indices of case 1 and case 2 is in the third decimal. The
reason behind such a small improvement is likely to be that even though the U-tanks distrib-
ute the flooded water more evenly across the ship, they also allow more water to enter the
ship. The added weight partially negates the effects of the more symmetrical weight distri-
bution.
Polar Code requires s to be equal to one for all loading conditions, meaning basically that
the angle of heel cannot exceed 7°. Therefore, U-tanks would be useful in regards to Polar
Code, because they reduce unsymmetrical flooding and thus also reduce heeling. However,
because the initial design was already nearly adequate for Polar Code -requirements, the
additional U-tanks bring no practical improvement. The only damage, which does not satisfy
the damage stability regulations of Polar Code is damage to tanks, which do not reach double
bottom and cannot be transformed to U-tanks.
Because the achieved benefits in the A-index were minimal and no improvement was seen
regarding Polar Code, addition of U-tanks is not a practical solution in the improvement of
damage stability.
6.1.3 Case 3: Denser transversal subdivision
SOLAS 2020: fulfilled (A = 0.72598)
Polar Code: fulfilled (s = 1 for all loading conditions)
An A-index bigger than the R-index required by SOLAS 2020 could be achieved by dividing
nearly all tanks in the double bottom, and majority of the tanks at the sides, in half. Also,
two of the tanks not in contact with the shell needed to be halved. This means that major
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changes in the subdivision were required to increase the A-index of the initial design by the
0.03 that it was lacking.
As for the Polar Code requirements, no additional measures were needed to fulfil them. The
added subdivision required to satisfy SOLAS 2020 automatically removed the only issue
with the ice damages in the initial design. The only ice damage, which had s < 1, was no
longer a problem because the compartments it concerned had been divided in half, thus al-
lowing lesser volume of flooded water to enter the ship.
While the new damage stability requirements could be fulfilled with denser transversal sub-
division and the design could be realized, it might not be the most practical solution. A great
number of bulkheads needed to be added resulting to a garbled general arrangement.
6.1.4 Case 4: Cross-flooding
SOLAS 2020: not fulfilled (A = 0.7142)
Polar Code: not fulfilled (one damage, where s < 1)
The damage stability requirements of SOLAS 2020 were not fulfilled - but almost, as the A-
index was only 0.0078 below the requires index R. This was achieved by only adding four
cross-flooding pipes in the double bottom of the ship. Otherwise the design was identical to
the initial design, where A-index was more than 0.02 smaller.
Again, only one damage does not satisfy the requirements of Polar Code. This damage, same
as in cases 1 and 2, is located at compartments on the level of deck 3. Adding cross-flooding
pipes would not be practical due to the location of the damaged compartments. More sensible
solution is to revise the subdivision at that particular location.
6.1.5 Case 5: Final design
SOLAS 2020: fulfilled (A = 0.72508)
Polar Code: fulfilled (s = 1 for all loading conditions)
With just a few changes to the subdivision and new placement for one of the cross-flooding
pipes, SOLAS 2020 damage stability regulations could be easily fulfilled. The general ar-
rangement is clear and organized.
Polar Code requirements could also be easily fulfilled by adding just one transversal bulk-
head near the stern.
The design of case 5 was chosen as the final design, because it complies with both the dam-
age stability regulations of SOLAS 2020 and those of Polar Code. Also, case 5 is superior
to case 3 (which also satisfies these regulations), in that the design is less complicated and
therefore more practical.
6.1.6 Conclusion and comparison of cases
In SOLAS 2020, for cruise ships with less than 400 people on board, the required index R is
a constant 0.722. The case ship in this thesis has a total of 273 people on board, with lifeboats
provided for 272 persons. Therefore, according to SOLAS 2009, the required index is R =
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0.688 (equation (11), chapter 3.2.4). The new R-index is difficult to achieve, which is un-
derstandable since the R-index in SOLAS 2020 is 5% bigger than the R-index in SOLAS
2009 for this case ship. All the cases in this thesis, including the initial design (case 1) and
versions A and B of case 3 (see appendix 4) have a high enough A-index for SOLAS 2009.
Only two of the cases, case 3 and case 5 have an A-index higher than the R-index in SOLAS
2020.
The damage stability regulations of Polar code were easy to obey. In all the cases studied in
this thesis, either one or none of the damages caused by ice fell short of the requirements of
Polar Code. Because the case ship has flat sides, in most of the ship the longitudinal extent
of the damage caused by ice was 1.5% of the UIWL. All compartments, except the two air
channels on each side located next to each other, were longer than the extent of the damage.
This means that the only three-compartment damages were ones that involved two air chan-
nels and one other compartment. Because of the small volume of the air channels, these
three-compartment damages were not crucial to the s-factor. Due to the flat sides of the ship,
only a couple compartments were centred forward of the maximum breadth of the UIWL.
These compartments were longer than the longitudinal extent of the ice damage there, 4.5%
of the UIWL. Therefore, at that area there was no three-compartment damages. A ship with
more curved sides might have more problems with Polar Code, as more compartments would
be located forward from the maximum breadth of the UIWL.
Optimal solution was found by using cross-flooding pipes as the main method and comple-
menting that with minor changes to the subdivision at specific locations, where the achieved
A-index was the furthest away from its potential. The fact that the addition of cross-flooding
pipes to certain tanks had far greater effect than halving them with a bulkhead would suggest
that the location of the flooded water inside the ship is more important to the damage stability
than the amount of the flooded water. However, the amount of flooded water cannot be for-
gotten, because the additional U-tanks did not have the same effect as the cross-flooding
pipes. The U-tanks, which go across the whole ship, take in more water than two tanks of a
three-tank row across the ship. Also, in the case of a U-tank, the water floods first to the
damaged side, then to the middle and last to the undamaged side. In case of two tanks on the
sides connected with a cross-flooding pipe, the water floods first to the damaged side and
then to the undamaged side, allowing the fluid equalization be more balanced than with U-
tanks.
6.2 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis is used to study how sensitive the results obtained by a model are for the
changing of starting values and hypotheses. Analysis is executed by using variables, which
are assumed to have significant effect on the result. First, the variables are changed one at a
time while other variables are kept same to see the effect of an individual variable. Then, all
the variables are set in their extreme values to observe the combined effect of the variables.
The reason for doing sensitivity analysis is to find out how the uncertainty of the starting
values affects the final results.
For this case study, the most significant starting values are considered to be the trim and the
vertical centre of gravity of the ship’s lightweight. Their effect is observed by changing their
value +/-0.1 m from the values used in calculation within the case study. The sensitivity
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analysis is performed for the final design (case 5). The effect of changing the values is stud-
ied through comparing the changes in the total A-index, the A-index of a fully loaded ship
(initial condition DS) and the required minimum GM. The results of the sensitivity analysis
are shown in tables 5 and 6.
Table 5. Results of the sensitivity analysis
Case A-index minGM
Total DS SOLAS 2020 SOLAS 2009
Original 0.72508 0.71679 1.437 1.313
C1 0.70129 0.70325 1.420 1.317
C2 0.74942 0.73346 1.436 1.313
C3 0.72442 0.71682 1.439 1.312
C4 0.72571 0.71685 1.434 1.312
C5 0.70047 0.70171 1.415 1.317
C6 0.74907 0.74131 1.455 1.326
Table 6. Results of the sensitivity analysis as per cents
Case A-index minGM
Total DS SOLAS 2020 SOLAS 2009
C1 -3.28 % -1.89 % -1.18 % +0.30 %
C2 +3.36 % +2.33 % -0.07 % 0.00 %
C3 -0.09 % 0.00 % +0.14 % -0.08 %
C4 +0.09 % +0.01 % -0.21 % -0.08 %
C5 -3.39 % -2.10 % -1.53 % +0.30 %
C6 +3.31 % +3.42 % +1.25 % +0.99 %
In case C1, the VCG of the ship’s lightweight is raised 0.1 m and in C2 lowered 0.1 m. In
case C3 the trim is 0.1 m and in C4 -0.1 m. In C5, both the VCG and the trim are set at +0.1
m. In case C6, both of the values are -0.1 m.
From the results it can be seen that the A-index is most affected by the change in the VCG
of the ship’s lightweight. Increasing the VCG by 0.1 m decreases the total A-index by over
3% and decreasing the VCG causes also over 3% change, but to the opposite direction.
Changing the trim by 0.1 m changes the A-index only by 0.09%.
The biggest change in the required minimum GM is seen in case C1. Raising the VCG by
0.1 m causes over 1% decrease for the minimum GM in SOLAS 2020 requirements and
nearly third of a per cent increase in SOLAS 2009 requirements.
The required minimum GM in SOLAS 2009 changes the least, with all of the variation being
less than 1%. The most affected result is the total A-index, which in four of the six cases
varies more than three per cents of the original results. The biggest changes happen naturally
at cases C5 and C6, where both the VCG and the trim increased or decreased. The largest
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deviation (3.42%) is in the partial A-index when the VCG and the trim are both decreased
by 0.1 m.
In general, the minimum GM is less affected by the changes in the initial conditions than the
A-index. Results to the minimum GM calculated with SOLAS 2009 requirements are con-
siderably less sensitive to the uncertainty of initial conditions than the results calculated with
SOLAS 2020.
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7 Conclusion
In this thesis, a cruise ship, complying with the damage stability regulations of both the
upcoming SOLAS 2020 and the newly implemented Polar Code, was designed. The case
ship was a modern cruise ship carrying 273 people and operating in polar waters. The sub-
division of the initial design was based on similar ships of similar purpose previously de-
signed to comply with SOLAS 2009. The optimal design was found by iterating the initial
design through the use of subdivision, U-tanks and cross-flooding as solutions for sufficient
damage stability.
The results of the case study indicate that the best solution is to have three tanks next to each
other transversally across the ship in the double bottom. The two tanks on the sides of the
ship of the three-tank row should be connected with cross-flooding pipes. In that way, sym-
metrical distribution of flooded water is ensured, while the intake of too much of the flooded
water is avoided. U-tanks would also distribute the added weight of the flooded water evenly,
but they would have to take more water in. Denser subdivision would limit the intake of
flooded water, but have the added weight distributed asymmetrically. The three-tank ar-
rangement with cross-flooding pipes is therefore the best solution. Symmetry seems to be
the biggest factor in complying with the damage stability regulations of both SOLAS 2020
and Polar Code. The symmetrical distribution of added weight is a positive influence to the
A-index and also prevents the ship from heeling over the limits dictated by Polar Code.
While sufficient damage stability could be achieved with just denser transversal subdivision,
it was found that using only alterations to subdivision as an overall solution was not practical.
Added bulkheads worked better as individual corrections to complement the use of cross-
flooding as the main design solution. The straight sides of the case ship seemed to help with
the compliance with Polar Code, since they meant that for most of the ship, the length of the
ice damages was considered to be the shorter of the two options. The damage stability regu-
lations of SOLAS 2020 were more limiting and causing more changes to the design than
those of Polar Code.
SOLAS 2020 has considerably higher R-index for passenger ships than SOLAS 2009. The
change in the R-index affects especially cruise ships and raise their safety considerably.
RoPax vessels have to comply with the Stockholm Agreement, which has through water-on-
deck requirements set higher standards for damage stability than SOLAS, and thus they were
already designed with higher A-index than SOLAS required. Cruise ships do not need to
consider water-on-deck situations and therefore a change to a higher R-index is a bigger
adjustment for cruise ships.
Other factor that improves safety in SOLAS 2020 is that the number of seats in lifeboats in
relation to number of passengers no longer affects the index. This enables the use of modern
marine evacuation systems (MES), such as using an inflatable slide to evacuate passengers
straight to life rafts. MES makes evacuation faster not only when the ship is flooding, but in
other emergencies, such as fire.
For smaller cruise ships with less than 400 people on board, such as the case ship on this
study, perhaps the most interesting change is that R is constant. This brings added challenge
to smaller ships, because in SOLAS 2009 less people on board meant a smaller R-index.
According to the new regulations, a cruise ship with for example 100 passengers will have
the same required R-index than a cruise ship with 300 passengers.  Also, the number of
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passengers is the only determining variable in the calculation of the R-index. The length of
the ship is not considered in the calculation of the R-index in SOLAS 2020. This is also an
added disadvantage for smaller cruise ships. Previously, the shorter the ship was, the smaller
the R-index was. With the new regulations, designing a smaller ship will bring no relief to
the R-index.
The damage stability regulations of Polar Code provide more safety along with more design
challenges to ships operating in polar waters. As a completely new set of rules, Polar Code
forces designers to consider cases they have not previously needed to deal with, such as the
angle of heel caused by ice damages.
While the case study in this thesis gives an indication of how the new damage stability reg-
ulations will affect the design of small cruise ships, it must be noted, that only one case ship
was studied and therefore the results are not statistically significant. For better understand-
ing, more ships with different hull shapes and main dimensions should be studied. Also, to
get a better overall view and to have comparison for the smaller ships, the effect of the reg-
ulations on cruise ships with more than 400 passengers should be investigated. This would
show in practice whether the new regulations benefit ships of certain length or ships carrying
certain number of passengers. The effect of Polar Code and whether it is a more limiting
factor for different sized ships would also be interesting to study.
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8 Reflection
There is still need for more research to the calculation of the R-index and the damage stabil-
ity of passenger ships in general. The probabilistic method of calculation adopted in SOLAS
2009 and also used in SOLAS 2020 is more realistic than the previously used deterministic
method. However, the safety level indicated by SOLAS is considerably different to the safety
level found with numerical simulations and in real case experiences. In the last 20 years, the
research concerning damage stability has focused on RoPax. Therefore, the applicability of
the s-factor for cruise ships is questionable. Despite the differences between RoPax and
cruise ships, one level of R is defined for all passenger ships. For better damage stability
regulation, quantification of real safety level for cruise ships is needed.
SOLAS has several simplifications, which affect its ability to reflect real-life situations.
These simplifications are for example that grounding is not included in the attained index
and the probability of sea state is not considered. Also, complex subdivision is not covered
by actual s-factor. To improve the damage stability regulations of SOLAS, impact of the
aspects described above should be quantified, preparation to apply first-principle methods
should be done and methodology to use numerical simulations should be created.
Polar Code, due to being very new and not having many references in real life, is still lacking
in many respects. Damage stability rules can be interpreted in different ways. Overall, Polar
Code has issues with consistency of the precision of the rules, which makes interpretation
more difficult. Also, Polar Code is missing some important parts and is vague in regards to
some. While the missing or vague parts might not be directly related to the damage stability,
they indicate that Polar Code is still a work in progress.
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